Should he stay or should he go?

Should he stay or should he go? Political elite perceptions of ‘rules’ for effective blame management behaviour by ministers in a coalition system Minou de Ruiter MSc Utrecht University [email protected]

Draft version: please do not cite Abstract: This study focuses on the perception and ‘rules’ key political actors use to describe how ministers should act, who they should be and when they should resign during incident-induced blame games. Personal scandals and high-profile policy failures question the reputation and legitimacy of governments and trigger calls for resignation of the responsible minister(s). These demands for accountability are part constitutional reflex, part social ritual, part political drama. To ward off blame and survive in office, office-holders have to defend themselves and their civil servants in such a way that media storms subside and parliamentary majorities are satisfied. While most studies of blame avoidance used case studies to distil and test blame avoidance ‘decision trees’ (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003) or models of ‘staged retreat’ for ministers (Hood et al, 2009), recent studies underlined the need to study differences in attribution of blame in various political systems and cultural contexts. This study analyzes 32 Dutch elite interviews with journalists, (ex)ministers, parliamentarians and top civil servants using qualitative vignettes. The analysis explores how key political elite actors themselves assess effective blame avoidance behavior of troubled ministers, with regard to 1) norms 2) strategies, 3) reputation and 4) political context, during incident-induced blame games in coalition governments. This paper combines and advances insights from research on political accountability, blame avoidance/crisis exploitation, ministerial resignations and (political) leadership. Should I stay or should I go now? Should I stay or should I go now? If I go there will be trouble And if I stay it will be double So come on and let me know Should I stay or should I go? (Chorus of ‘Should I stay or should I go?’ The Clash, 1981)

Word count (without abstract, footnotes and appendices): 8.324

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Imagine a minister receiving expensive gifts from private companies, a minister being confronted with a deathly accident in a prison facility, or a minister under attack for funding a fraud-prone home insulation program that is also said to have caused several deaths. Such incidents often trigger heightened scrutiny in which responsible ministers have to publicly account for their behavior and the behavior of the civil servants in their department (Bovens, 2007; Djerf-Pierre et al, 2013). These demands for accountability are part constitutional reflex, part social ritual, part political drama. The symbolic order of things appear to have been compromised, so ‘an adequately blameworthy agent’ needs to be found to purify the system (Shklar, 1990; 62). During ‘blame games’ triggered by political incidents, civil servants, ministers, parliamentarians and the media struggle over the question whether an incident is an accident or a mistake, who is to blame and who will be framed as scapegoat (Hood, 2011; Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003; Boin et al, 2009). Politically, such incidents provide an opportunity for an opposition to expose the flaws of the incumbent government and put pressure on the governing parties. To ward off blame and to survive in office, office-holders have defend themselves and their civil servants in such a way that media storms subside and parliamentary majorities are satisfied (Boin et al, 2009; Hood et al, 2009; Brändström & Kuipers, 2003). The question that remains is: How can ministers ward off blame and survive intact after political incidents? Although there has been an insurgence of research into blame avoidance behaviour of political executives, it is widely acknowledged that blame avoidance literature suffers from a neglect of contextual factors in explaining the process of blame avoidance in different political systems (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015; 140). Most research used game theoretical tools or experiments to almost meticulously assess the effect of certain presentational strategies on media-firestorms (Hood, 2002; Hood et al, 2009) or blame assessments by the public (McGraw, 1990; 1991; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006; 2007). Primary focus lied so far on modelling the discursive content of blame avoidance strategies, in the form of blame avoidance ‘decision trees’ (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003), models of ‘staged retreat’ for ministers (Hood et al, 2009) or ‘political

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crisis exploitation games’ (Boin et al, 2009). These studies often stressed the need to study differences in attribution of blame in various political systems and cultural contexts in the discussion of their findings (Mortensen, 2013; Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003). Recently, Hinterleitner and Sager (2015) concluded that while their study shows the necessity of context sensitive blame avoidance research, the lack of comparative studies makes it difficult to assess which important contextual factors to include. This study addresses this neglect, by assessing how political elites in a coalition context discern typical patterns of blame games and what they perceive as important rules for ministers to live by during blame games. This study specifically looks at assessments of blame game patterns in a parliamentary system with primarily coalition governments, the Netherlands. So far, blame avoidance research focused on ministerial survival in Westminster two-party systems (Hood et al, 2009; Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015). The lack of focus on the blame games in coalition democracies is quite surprising as Strøm and others (2008) and Hobolt and Karp (2010; 300) conclude that coalition governments are the norm in parliamentary

democracies,

the

latter

noticing

a

growing

‘coalition

trend’

in

parliamentary systems in the last twenty years. This study aims to address both lacunae. The aim of this explorative article is to obtain insight in the rules for blame games and effective blame management behavior by ministers in a specific coalition system. We will analyze the ways in which 32 interviewees (grouped into four actors involved in political blame games surrounding ministers: ministers, parliamentarians, journalists, civil servants) interpret ministerial behavior in a series of standardized hypothetical situations. Drawing on this vignette methodology, this article explores perceptions of effective blame avoidance behaviour in coalition context and refines and contributes to current understandings of blame management, political accountability and ministerial survival/resignation in a specific political system.

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UNDERSTANDING MINISTERIAL BLAME MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOUR IN COALITION CONTEXT: RATIONALE

Discursive blame management strategies for political executives under pressure have been increasingly studied and myriad models of discursive strategies abound (Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003; Hood, 2011; Hood et al, 2009; Boin et al, 2009). The models draw on a wide variety of strategy categories, alternating between the incorporation of anticipatory and reactive strategies (Hood, 2011), defensive and offensive

strategies

(Boin

et

al,

2009)

and

allowing

sequences

of

strategies

(Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003; Hood et al, 2009). These categorizations all build on the same interpretation of blame management strategies as discursive contests in which political executives and other (elite) actors try to shape and construct public interpretations of certain incidents (Edelman, 1974; 174). According Edelman’s thesis on politics as spectacle however, the persuasiveness of these strategies depend on the conventions and perceptions held by participants in the political world, the audience (Edelman, 1988; 96). These, often implicit, conventions are part of the political context, defining the leeway political executives and their adversaries have in maneuvering in these blame games. Therefore, this study contributes to understanding of blame game processes by exploring which ‘rules’ political elite participants in blame games discern and how they construct effective blame management behaviour. Political elite participants in this study are the four actors who play an active role in constructing and shaping blame games: the ministers themselves, media, parliament (opposition and coalition parties) and top civil servants. Also in the research on political accountability of political executives, parliament and increasingly media are distinguished as the most important forums to hold ministers to account (Rudolph, 2003). The second contribution of this paper is the coalition context of the actors under study. As already mentioned in the introduction, the way coalition governments shape

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blame game patterns is an underexplored area of study.

The need to study blame

game patterns for ministers in a coalition democracy becomes more pressing as we consider that the institutional context for the resignation of ministers is much more difficult in coalition democracies. In Westminster democracies the prime minister can almost solely decide to replace ministers, thus making the ‘blame game’ rather simple (Bovens et al, 2014; 2). In consensual democracies, in contrast, the system of multiparty coalition government constrains prime-ministerial power and discretion. The resignation of a cabinet minister in a coalition government can upset the party of the minister concerned, threaten the position of that party in the coalition and can lead to ‘eye for an eye’ considerations between coalition parties (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005; 141). The inherent need to make political compromises between political parties and the fact that the enemy today can be the ally of tomorrow could change the dynamics of how blame games are played.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Ours is an explorative study of the perceptions of political elite participants regarding effective ministerial blame management and the context of blame games in coalition governments. This is not to say that we disregard all the work that has been done in understanding discursive blame management strategies and semantic postures of leaders after political incidents. Our study aims to reflect on how political elite participants of blame games assess these strategies. Our research also reflects on which of the many contextual factors identified in earlier studies are perceived as important by the actors in a coalition context (Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015). To examine our central question, we perform an explorative qualitative design in which we analyze what 32 key actors perceive as leading rules in the Dutch blame game and, specifically, effective blame avoidance behaviour for ministers in a coalition context. These 32 in-depth, semi-structured, interviews were conducted between July

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and December 2014. During the interviews, we combined qualitative vignette methodology, in the form of a series of standardized hypothetical situations, with openended questions.i The pragmatic combination of both vignettes and open-ended questions made sure there was balance between ‘response validity’, by providing interviewees latitude to articulate and explain their views (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; 674), and comparability, by letting interviewees reflect on comparable situations (Renold, 2002).ii Vignettes

are

‘short

stories

about

hypothetical

characters

in

specified

circumstances, to whose situations the interviewee is invited to respond’ (Finch, 1987; 105). The first advantage of these qualitative vignettes is that ‘by putting themselves in the character’s place, participants assume that the protagonist is exposed to the same group norms as themselves and so explicate those norms in their responses to the vignettes’ (Jenkins et al, 2010; 180-181). Second, qualitative vignettes can help to ‘desensitize’ accountability dilemmas from entrenched party positions and recent political incidents (Barter and Renold, 2000; Finch, 1987; Wilks, 2004; 81; Jenkins et al, 2010). The political sensitive nature of this research required a safe setting in order to receive a genuine response (Hughes & Huby, 2002; Wilks, 2004; 82; Jenkins et al, 2010; 181) without endangering the current position of the respondent. iii Interviewees were asked to reflect on three qualitative vignettes iv: short simpiflied and stylized descriptions of one personal scandal and two policy failures (see appendix).v The stories differed in their three-stage description of hypothetical ministerial conduct (Barter & Renold, 2000; 310; Hughes, 1998; 384; Finch, 1987). Throughout the stages of each vignette, the interviewees were invited to respond on how they valued the incident, what they would imagine the minister would do and how they would act if they were the minister themselves. The group of interviewees did not consist of a representative sample of each of the key actors, which prevents generalizability of the findings. Rather, the central aim was uncovering and eliciting actors’ interpretation of effective ministerial BA behaviour in incident-related accountability processes. The interviewees were therefore selected

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on the basis of an evenly handled distribution across the four types of and within-group selection based on relevant and or duration of personal experience.vi Within the groups of actors, the sample includes variation on some key divisions within each group. vii Table 1 shows the variation of interviewees over the different groups and within each group.

Groups

Interviews

Journalists

9

Parliamentarians

8

Ex-(junior) ministers

7

Top civil servants

8

Backgrounds represented within groups: Print media: Volkskrant, Trouw, Telegraaf, Elsevier, VN, NRC (2x), Groene Amsterdammer , TV: Pauw&Witteman Labour, Social liberals, Conservative liberals, Socialists (2x), Christian democrats (2x), Orthodox protestant Portfolio: Justice, Social affairs, Defense, Home affairs, Environment, Education Party affiliation: Conservative liberals (3x), Labour (3x), Social liberals Department: Justice (at least 5), Education, Economic Affairs, Environment

Total interviews: 32 Table 1: background of interviewees (detailed information upon request)

All interviews were tape-recorded, written into verbatim transcripts and coded using Nvivo software. Three types of codes where used: manifest codes to direct responses to the fixed questions and vignettes, latent codes of characteristics of the response that were not explicitly asked and last, global codes for the general styles of certain interviewees (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; 675). In the end, the analysis of the interviews was validated with the interviewees (Lilleker, 2003; Sabot, 1999; Woliver, 2002). Further in this study, we first describe briefly the Dutch context of formal ministerial responsibility and the historical pattern of ministerial resignations. We then thematically discuss the four themes that the political elite actors discerned: (1) Norms of ministerial responsibility (institutional context), (2) strategies of the minister and timing and tone, (3) the ministers’ reputation and (4) the political context.

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The Dutch constitutional framework of ministerial responsibility Political accountability processes are embedded in constitutional rules and historical precedents regarding ministerial responsibility. Before one can assess the perceptions of the accountability actors regarding appropriate ministerial conduct, it is important to describe the historical and constitutional framework that confines these actors. The Dutch Council of State defines ministerial responsibility as a pro-active ‘legal duty’ of the minister to provide parliament with information on and to account for government actions in the defence of the public interest and the performance of the duties attached to the office of Minister (cited in: Visser, 2008; 87). Only article 42.2 and article 68 of the Dutch constitution of 1848 deal explicitly with ministerial responsibility. In the constitutional sense, ‘public interest’ is not defined and only limited by the boundaries set by parliament (Visser, 2008; 112). In absence of a clear constitutional interpretation, ministerial responsibility is largely defined by convention and ‘unwritten constitutional law’ (Visser, 2008; 306). The Carrington-doctrine is an important unwritten Dutch parliamentary norm, which provides a broad definition of ministerial responsibility. The doctrine, introduced to parliament by the party leader of the Conservative Liberals in 1989, uses the British Lord Carrington as an ‘honourable example’ of a minister who resigned because of major

mistakes

by

his

civil

servants

despite

having

no

personal

culpability

(Nieuwenkamp, 2001; 26; Bovens, 2000; 13). Some Dutch constitutional scholars prefer to confine ministerial responsibility to ministerial culpability (Tuurenhout, 1992). An important aspect of political accountability is the way the norm of ministerial responsibility can be enforced (Fischer, 2012; 600; cf. Woodhouse, 1993; 279). Parliament can sanction ministers who are found wanting in the execution of their ministerial responsibilities. Guiding the sanctioning process is the ‘negative confidence rule’: the constitutional principle that parliamentary confidence in a minister exists until specifically stated otherwise by a parliamentary majority, which case a minister has to

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resign (Visser, 2008; 85)viii. A vote of no confidence by parliament is therefore the ‘ultimate, in fact mandatory, sanction’ that can be applied to a Minister (Bovens et al, 2014; 1; Visser, 2008; 136). However, according to Broeksteeg (2008; 174), the vote of no-confidence is a constitutional doctrine, which means that in practice, ministers can give account and still resign and the other way around. Between 1946 and 2010, 719 cabinet ministers (junior and senior) have served in 26 Dutch cabinets (Bovens et al, 2014; 6). More than one in seven (n=108) resigned before the end of their term (Bovens et al, 2014; 6). Of those, 38 resigned for political reasons, such as internal conflict in the cabinet and 16 ministers resigned because of a loss of confidence from either a coalition party or from parliament. In the period 1981-2010, 328 official votes of no-confidence were tabled against an individual minister, leading to only seven resignations (Bovens et al, 2014; 19).

MINISTERIAL BLAME AVOIDANCE BEHAVIOUR IN CONTEXT: TEN RULES OF THE DUTCH BLAME GAME (a)

Institutional context: ministerial responsibility and integrity rules enforce norm expectations on ministers

1. Institutional context: Ministerial responsibility works as a spotlight on the minister. In general, all interviewees underscored the value of the convention of ministerial responsibility: ministers are in general accountable for all events related their portfolio responsibilities. When an incident occurs, the emphasis on ministerial responsibility explains the immediate focus of media and opposition on the minister. Hinterleitner and Sager (2015; 154) also observed that the convention of ministerial responsibility is an important demarcation of the blame game arenas. Almost all interviewees referred to the Carrington doctrine as an ideal practice, as the ‘honourable thing to do’: ministers taking responsibility (in the form of resignation) of own accord for failures in which they had no personal involvement. Interestingly, almost all interviewees assumed that this ‘doctrine’ was an internationally held principle, instead

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of a Dutch grown norm. Although journalists often were the most cynical about accountability processes, half of the journalists (and also some others) did talk about a minister’s resignation as an important ‘symbolic gesture’.

‘It is about the symbolic effect, on the public stage of politics. Voters should see a politician who has to guts to take responsibility for his mistakes’ (journalist ix

2) .

Thompson already argued that taking responsibility can become a political ritual for political officials, a way of ‘strengthens his or her own political standing-by reassuring the public that someone is in charge and by projecting an image of a courageous leader who does not pass the buck’ (Thompson, 1980; 907). However, interviewees also notice the need to distinguish responsibility and resignation.

‘Well, in principle you are responsible for everything that happened under your watch and that of your predecessors. The difference is what consequences you draw from that conclusion, a poorly distinguished difference. So opponents say: you are responsible. I will respond accordingly: yes, I am responsible, but that does not mean you have to execute me for it’ (ex-minister 1).

When

the interviewer

asks

the interviewees to explain

x

the relation

between

responsibility and a ministers’ ‘death sentence’, they did not solely describe the xi

seriousness of the administrative mistakes, as is the case in the Carrington-doctrine , but more in terms of ‘trust’ or ‘confidence’ in the minister.

‘What is essential is just whatever naughtiness happened when you were responsible, it was all about confidence. Do you have confidence that that man

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or women will do something.. And will correct mistakes in the system or xii

something’ (ex-minister 4).

A parliamentarian explains that the term ‘trust’ in these sentences implicitly refers to broader confidence than the constitutional norm.

‘What you see seeping through... strictly speaking someone does not have to resign when he loses confidence of the press, or from the average Joe on the street, but of course it is a factor which is taken into account. Especially when there is a lack of trust between citizens and government. It does not help when one feels an atmosphere that the minister will be held in position at all costs’ xiii

(parliamentarian 4).

Nineteen interviewees talked about the importance of the reputation of a minister, the ‘atmosphere’ of the incident, as something which defines the accountability process. Civil servants often complained about the role of ‘images’ and ‘irrationality’ in political accountability

processes.xiv

Clearly,

interviewees

used

perceived

ministerial

responsibility in intuitive terms: symbolic, trust, confidence and atmosphere. Similar to the Westminster context (Hinterleitner and Sager, 2015; 154), the convention of ministerial responsibility concentrates the spotlights on ministers when political incidents occur under their watch. Responsibility demands a symbolic gesture, ranging from resigning to other acts to restore confidence and trust of both parliament and the ‘average Joe’. Therefore, the convention of ministerial responsibility could limit possibilities to pass the buck to lower actors or to stay silent.

2. Institutional context: Don’t make ethical blunders. An observation shared by many interviewees is: a minister who is hit by an integrity scandal is already one step behind compared to a minister confronted with a policy failure. Twenty interviewees underlined this idea, some even before discussing the integrity vignette. When asked

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to explain why an integrity scandal is so much more damaging, two lines of arguments came up. First, the societal acceptance for these types of scandals has diminished considerably, leading to tightening political norms. ‘The nature of constitutional foundations can evolve and here (points at integrity vignette) we have one of the most interesting examples of norms that have changed considerably… it is clear that the societal and political acceptance of this xv

type of conflict of interests has diminished considerably’ (ex-minister 1).

Second, official Dutch political norms are quite strict on what is considered not-integer for Dutch ministers. Many interviewees referred to the ‘little blue book’, a compendium of quite strict rules of conduct Dutch ministers have to adhere to. The ‘little blue book’ for example explicates the registration or even rejection of gifts over 50 euros (Ministerie van Algemene Zaken, 2010; 31). These strict written norms give media and opposition a more precise yardstick to measure the behaviour of minister than in case of policy failures. ‘In parliament you want to uphold a norm that you do not accept a bit of skullduggery. So parliament has to be very strict in that, also from an idea of norm enforcement (..) In policy failures, or incidents, there is more leeway: you have to be more careful (to demand resignation). Because if you would be consistently strict, in large departments like Justice, things can go wrong. And the immediate resignation of a minister then would not enhance the quality of the executive. On the other hand, with regard to integrity questions, we don’t want any fuss with that’ (parliamentarian 4).

xvi

The idea of norm enforcement is in line with Uhr’s (2005; 1) conceptualization of ministerial responsibility as a label which covers ‘several norms of appropriate ministerial conduct’. The recent history of Dutch resignations underscores both arguments: a junior minister was forced to resign by his party in 2013 due to personal

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use of his travel expense claims. However, even in integrity scandals, there could be ways out for a minister according to a parliamentarian. ‘I presume this type of scenario would be the end of a ministers’ career. Unless the minister can rely on strong parliamentary support and everyone argues: we don’t want to lose him, because he is such a good minister and very popular. However, the minister will still be on probation: parliament will disapprove his behaviour, but he doesn’t have to go. The once-but-never-again situations’ (Exxvii

parliamentarian 3).

Interviewees expressed two clear ‘rules’ which demarcate the institutional context of the blame game arena for ministers. First, the convention of ministerial responsibility focuses attention on ministers in incidents and creates expectations of symbolic gestures and actions to restore confidence. Second, integrity incidents are very much norm-related and therefore often transcend the political bickering by receiving condemnation by opposition and coalition parties. With regard to policy failures, interviewees expressed much more room for maneuver for ministers.

(b)

Blame management behaviour: more than discursive strategies

3. Strategies: mortal sins to avoid. Much effort in blame avoidance research is devoted gauging the effectiveness of the repertoire of blame avoidance strategies. In the Dutch political system certain strategies are more accepted than others, with some groups perceiving certain strategies as ‘weak strategies’ or ‘mortal sins’. While many strategies were mentioned in response to the hypothetical situations, ten interviewees

xviii

spontaneously used the word ‘mortal sin’ to describe a strategy a minister should never

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use. Two types of strategies were called ‘mortal sins’: ‘providing parliament with wrong information’ and ‘blaming civil servants’.

‘If he provides parliament with the wrong information, he will have to resign. It is no longer about the content of the failure.. It is like a law, the biggest sin you can commit in politics is providing parliament with the wrong information intentionally’ (parliamentarian 8).

xix

More than half of the top civil servants explained their most important task during these incidents being the provision of the minister with as much as information possible, in order to avoid this mortal sin. Half of the civil servants also mentioned another ‘mortal sin’: ministers blaming their own staff:

‘Look, (a current junior minister), who suddenly got involved, who suddenly lost it in parliament, who could not make a stand, who had no authority there, She made the mistake to blame her civil servants. So everyone got involved and suddenly it is a crisis’ (top civil servant 1).

xx

While the first strategy is perceived as not appropriate, because it affects the credibility of the minister, the second strategy is perceived as ‘passing the buck’ (parliamentarian xxi

1).

The scapegoating of key officials during blame games is a well-known blame

avoidance strategy (Ellis, 1996; Hood, 2011). However according Bovens and others (1999) the status of Dutch civil servants as professional career civil servants will hamper scapegoating practices. Although ‘mortal sin’ could be more accepted in practice, the strategy could expose a minister to administrative leaks by offended civil servants. Both strategies therefore are seen as examples of defences of ‘weak ministers’ (top civil servant 3).

xxii

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4. Strategies to pursue: a Classical Dutch approach. In contrast to ‘mortal sins’, there are also strategies seen favourable to pursue by the minister, in particular a strategy called ‘the Classical Dutch approach’ (Journalist 3), which and a civil servant described as an ‘administrative attractive routine’ (top civil servant 3). This Dutch approach is ‘announcing an independent investigation’, the most advised response to both policy incidents. In fact, establishing an independent (blue-ribbon) inquiry was mentioned in 23 of the 32 interviews. According to interviewees, this strategy is appropriate, because it would buy the minister time to device a good strategy to the outside world and to parliament.

‘You need time to get all facts straight, so the first thing I would say to parliament is: listen, it doesn’t look good, but give me time to do an investigation and I will let you know what the findings are, what I did and did not do, or what will do in the future’ (ex-minister 7).

xxiii

‘With a highly political sensitive incident a firm investigation is always appropriate and especially an independent one, because if you fail to do this.. A hint of suspicion will stick to the incident: there could be more. (..) While, if you install a firm independent investigation and more things will be discovered, you can handle that yourself because it is you who discovered it (top civil servant xxiv

2).

However, not only will launching an independent investigation silence parliament and make the incident more manageable, according to a top civil servant with a background in inspection-work, it is also what the ‘public desires’.

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‘Because you have to investigate the incident first. It is a reflex, you know? And the public likes to see it this way…You can see that such an investigation funnels emotions’ (top civil servant 6).

xxv

Some interviewees expressed concerns about independent investigations. First, some civil servants saw it as only prolonging an incident and making it harder to manage. Second, when a minister installed an independent investigation, he commits himself to the outcome of the investigative report even when it is very critical of the actions of the minister. Surprisingly, in his work on the efficacy of these blame avoidance strategies, Sulitzeanu-Kenan (2006) found no relation between establishing an independent investigation and lowering responsibility attribution by citizens. Van Duin, et al (2013) concluded as well that installing independent inquiries after crises is no longer sufficient. They do not effectively de-escalate an incident anymore, and they do not have to calm the public mood, because continued coverage in social and television media keep passions aroused. However, it could be that in Dutch blame games, ‘launching an independent investigation’ is such an expected practice that it has become part of the ritual of effective ministerial blame management. Besides many references to the discursive content of blame management strategies, more than half of the interviewees explicitly reflected on the impression the minister should convey: decisiveness and humility. 5.

Strategies: Appear decisive. More than half of the interviewees at one point in

the interview reflected on the impression a minister should convey. For example all top civil servants reflected on the need for the balance between calmness and showing urgency as a response on the vignette describing a deathly fight in a prison facility. Often ministers and journalist considered ‘taking action’ (optreden) both a cliché and a required course of action.xxvi This response is related to an oft-used phrase of plagued Dutch minister, who assure publicly they want to ‘take action and not step down’.

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‘Ministers can make up for their mistakes when they grasp the nettle. If you want to know my thoughts, I would say: sounds appealing. It fits well with the public appreciation for vigour. A trend in politics is the need for vigour and decisiveness, no hesitation, but making decisions’ (journalist 2).xxvii

Or as an opposition parliamentarian explains quite cynically:

‘Another tactic is, and you see that often, (…) something terrible surfaces and Tuesday afternoon the minister says: well, we just decided yesterday, we (the coalition) debated and decided.. The minister stole all the thunder from the critics (parliamentarian 1).

xxviii

Interestingly, the other impression ministers have to convey, often mentioned by parliamentarians, is the impression of humility.

6.

Strategies: show humility. Multiple interviewees from all backgrounds elaborated

on the manner in which the minister should address parliament. For example in reaction to integrity incidents, besides ‘just don’t do it’ and ‘send all gifts back’, the most often heard advice to a minister was ‘show deep regret’ and be ‘very humble’.

‘Sometimes the debate can zoom in and on a certain moment, you see that the minister does not take parliament seriously and the tone can shift… If parliament then feels offended, even the more traditional parties would consider this a reason to draw a line. This is not right. That is the reason advisers often say: (name minister), repent, say sorry, and be humble. Then the coalition parties can

say:

the

minister

showed

understanding,

showed

repentance’

xxix

(parliamentarian 1).

17

‘You should not get the impression that ministers treat these things lightly. You would not expect such frivolousness by people on such a high post’ (journalist 9)

xxx

A good minister on the other hand, is a minister who: ‘treats parliament elegantly’ (exminister 1) and ‘who respects parliament’ (top civil servant 1). Although research on the efficacy blame avoidance strategies and accountability relations often takes into account the staging of strategies (e.g. Hood et al, 2009; Brandstrom & Kuipers, 2003), most research has no regard for the tone of these strategies. This omission is surprising in the light of the above implicit rules and in the light of findings by for example Hajer (2005) on the importance of dramaturgy in the process of policy deliberation. According to Hajer, ‘discussion is not merely talk, it is an act as well’ which takes place in a specific contexture (Hajer, 2005; 629). Although often mentioned as a sideline, the interviews suggest that ministers also need to dramaturgical performance to convey and balance certain impressions.

(c)

Reputation: the ministers background can be an important precursor for blame

7.

Reputation: the strong survive more easily. Boin and others (2009; 100)

concluded in their study on the political impact of crisis framing contests that during political incidents novel office-holders will be more easily left ‘off the hook’ and receive less criticism as opposed to public officials with a long political career. Although his observation was not contested by the interviewees, many stressed the importance of being regarded as a strong minister in the eyes of peers, an accomplishment which usually takes time. Perceptions of ‘being strong’ can have big influence on the ministers’ survival and even affect whether a mistake will morph into an incident.

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‘If you talk about an important player the stakes are high. The coalition can be in jeopardy. (..) For example, a small incident surrounding the minister of Finance is something different compared to incidents involving (a recently resigned junior minister). So these situational things are important: the position of the involved minister, their past, the position in his party, their image. If a minister has a rocksolid reputation and an incident occurs, the media will dismiss it: Hey dude, that's annoying, but it can happen, mistakes are not always preventable. However, if the minister is a bit of a bungler one smells blood (ex-minister 1).xxxi Interviewees identified position, reputation and case knowledge as the most important building blocks of a ministers’ ‘strength’. The first, often mentioned, element is (formal) position:

‘It depends on the role you fulfil. If that someone is the prime-minister, or the vice-president, then that person will have an important role. The minister of Finance’s position caries considerably more weight than a junior minister of social affairs. Therefore, someone’s weight in terms of their position and place in the political game plays an important role’ (parliamentarian 2).

The importance of reputation was visible by interviewees referring to the role of ‘authority’, meaning no less than ‘authoritative within his party, authoritative in parliament, authoritative among the opposition’ (journalist 1).xxxii For example, one junior minister was often mentioned as an example of an office-holder who was facing more than a few blameworthy incidents. However, because of his reputation as ‘a tough crime fighter’, he was considered the ‘electoral insurance policy’ by this party and to be defended at all costs (top civil servant 1). Policy expertise only takes a third place among the building blocks, according to one ex-minister.

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‘He has a good position in the party, and the moment someone else would do what he does, even if it is someone with way more knowledge of dossiers, then that person would be crushed’ (ex-minister 4).xxxiii

Also in recent studies of leadership capital, the notion is held that political leaders need to have a surplus authority beyond their formal authority, in order to mobilize people and convince peers and public, in this case, of their framing of the incidents (Bennister, ‘t Hart & Worthy, 2014). According to Bennister, ‘t Hart and Worthy, leadership capital consists of three components: relational capital, reputational capital and perceived skill capital (2014), which are closely related to the elements position, reputation and policy knowledge. However, ministers who are deemed as ‘strong’ are not invulnerable to incidents. It remains vital that they defend their reputation during blame games (Moynihan, 20120). After all, leadership capital is not a constant, it can be ‘used up’ (‘t Hart, 2014; 57).

8. Reputation:

avoid being seen as hapless or incorrigible. Recurrence of (similar)

incidents was perceived in 23 interviews as an important blow to a ministers’ reputation. Ministers who experienced recurring incidents were even referred to in judicial terms: as ‘repeat offender’ (journalist 1) or as carrying a ‘rap sheet’ (exminister 3). The notion appears that an accumulation of multiple incidents creates greater harm than the sum of its parts.

‘Suppose, ministers stay in office after that incident, but it adds up. You notice it often in parliament if there is yet another incident. (..)It adds to your score card. If news surrounding you is constantly of negative tone, then confidence of parliament will also consistently diminish… Recollection for negative matters is quite extensive’ (ex-minister 6)xxxiv

20

Therefore, the rule for ministers would be simple: do not reoffend. However, according an ex-minister, once tainted, the dents to a minister’s reputation are not easily mended.

‘The Parliament is like a pack of wolves, you understand? If they smell you are weak, whether you are a girl or a guy, there is a pecking order. They will tear at you, and you will beat them off, but they still wounded you a bit. And next time when you just healed, they will make another tear’ (ex-minister 3).xxxv

Not only parliament will remember previous blemishes on a reputation, the media also has a big impact on whether ministers are portrayed as ‘repeat offenders’:

‘The way it works is quite fascinating to see; the moment publicity and politics find each other in a way. Moments in which the chocolate-colored letters of the national newspapers play a role in politics. If you are framed as a bungler, or as a stumbler, or as… Such perceptions can amplify quite a lot of incidents’ (top civil servant 5).xxxvi

If therefore, a minister’s perceived ‘strength’ is weakened and his ‘clean sheet is smeared, a minister is severely damaged. Even though the minister can decide to hold on to his formal position without leadership capital (‘t Hart, 2014; 60), this will only be a matter of time, according to a former administrative head of a ministry.

‘I have regularly seen office-holders who had trouble coming to grip with political reality. As the head of the department, you try to help a troubled minister in a way, like you would help a dying man to die, help a man who does not understand he is dying’ (civil servant 2).xxxvii

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However, the Dutch ministerial history has quite some instances of severely damaged ministers serving out their term in office. The nail in the proverbial coffin, before a minister is forced to resign, is the rules that govern the broader political context. On two types of these rules most interviewees agreed on: the political leader is takes the final decision and coalition considerations play a vital role.

(d)

Political context: the political leader and the political mood seal the minister’s fate

9. Political context: The political leader will seal the minister’s fate. Interviewees considered parliament as single actor and media not the decisive actor in sanctioning the minister. Surprising, since the Dutch Parliament has considerable constitutional powers to sanction a minister (see p. 10). To many interviewees, the stability of coalition-opposition positions in parliament diminishes the influence of parliament as a forum. Only a couple of vital political parties in parliament play a role in the resignation of a minister: the ‘moderate opposition’ and the coalition partner of the minister under attack, according to a political leader of one of the ‘moderate’ opposition parties.

‘In these cases, the coalition party often makes an informal phone call to us to feel the temperature, because we are the ‘sane’ voice in parliament. We do not need to go along with the rest of the opposition, because we have a stable electoral base’ (parliamentarian 4)

xxxviii

Media are considered important criticasters, often perceived as ‘hyena’s’, and ‘packs’, although not in the aggressive tabloid style of Westminster countries (Bovens et al, 1999; 13). Two characteristics diminish the importance of media in the outcome of blame games. First, media have a very short memory, they lose interest quite fast.

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Second, media thrive on information: if no party in parliament really reacts to an incident, there are no leaks; the incident will probably not haunt the minister long. In two-party parliamentary systems, the Prime Minister is the pivotal figure who can sack and hire ministers almost at will (Dowding et al, 2015; Bovens et al, 2014; 2). In coalition systems, the political leader of his/her party will seal the minister’s fate in the conclusion of blame games, according to almost all interviewees. If the minister becomes a nuisance for the political leader - in parliament, cabinet or outside - the balance of the blame game shifts. If minister and Prime minister do not share party colours, the Prime Minister only has an advisory role; the prerogative is for the party leader of the ministers’ coalition party. ‘Mostly it is the party leader of parliament (who decides)…Who at one point will say: dear colleague, it is really untenable now. We regret it, but it would be better if you would leave, we cannot… and then a silent hint that it would also be better for the minister himself’ (ex-minister 1).xxxix Of course, many interviewees stressed resignation remains an individual choice for the minister. However, this option was mostly seen as an option for strong ministers, as one ex-minister explained: ‘He doesn’t have to resign! Although, if the party leader says: this is enough. But that doesn’t happen often. Unless there is something really wrong, if an officeholder has a reputation for being a weak minister, even though he cannot help it, then her reputation can become so fragile that the leader says: Right, miss, wouldn’t it be better to go?’ (ex-minister 3).xl This is in line with the observation of Bovens and others (2014; 1) that the, informal, ‘prerogative’ of the leaders of the coalition parties is ‘the hiring and firing of ministers’. The moment the political leader takes the decision to ‘help’ the minister resign however, depends on a delicate balance of election and coalition considerations.

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10. Political context: ‘A minister must not become an electoral liability or damage the coalition cohesion.’ Boin and others (2009; 99) already concluded that on balance, incidents closer to elections will raise ‘the likelihood of elite damage’. In the interviews, the leading factor for resignation was often referred to as ‘political opportunism’, a view especially propagated by civil servants and journalists.

‘The political leaders of the party will deliberate: how politically opportune it is to let a minister stay on. Even though if you strictly follow the line of ministerial responsibility the minister could be excused, political leaders also have a political responsibility (elections) and that can lead to another decision’ (journalist 2). Others were less understanding; one of the journalists (6) explained these resignations as ‘showing principles without the costs’. In the Netherlands, political resignations only happened 16 times since 1946 (Bovens et al, 2014). However, quite a lot of these resignations took place when elections were near or when the government already resigned and was on ‘caretaker’ status.

‘It is the political reality. The tempers are always running high, at that moment, so the tolerance level will go down. These are situational circumstances, in which constitutional theories will be weighed (…) Parties just do not want, during preparations for the election race a policy failure which distracts from their course. And in that way that office-holder will become a liability. And because he is a liability he can no longer function properly’ (ex-minister 1).

xli

‘Political opportunism’ is not only related to the timing of the elections however, interviewees also connected the term with perceptions of minister who become a nuisance for the party or the coalition partner, according to a former parliamentarian.

24

‘Someone who for example went too far and had to resign was (name junior

minister in the ‘90s). The reason was that the other coalition party just did not like him anymore. That party said to the junior minister: Boy, just do the honourable thing, because we cannot control ourselves. You made yourself really unpopular. It was not about what he did wrong, but just that they could not stand HIM anymore. You could translate that to a loss of confidence, not by a vote, but by a message from the political lead (parliamentarian 3). Political opportunity is mostly about perceptions of electoral risk and the party interest. However, twelve interviewees explained that it is hard to sack a minister, because there is a constant need for balance between the coalition parties.

‘If as a coalition party you demand the resignation of a minister from your coalition partner, you know that: a. the next time they will demand one of your ministers. That is first. It also will lead to trouble, there is quarrel in the coalition, you will get less things done, you might lose your budget or whatever, or

incur

loss

in

confidence

or

cooperation

between

the

parties,

or..’

xlii

(parliamentarian 3).

Similarly, existing research on ministerial resignations concluded that ‘far fewer ministerial resignations occur from coalition government than from single-party governments, mainly because prime ministers in coalition governments are unable, or much more reluctant to replace weak ministers, as this may upset one of the coalition parties’ (Bovens et al, 2014; 2). In the end, perceptions about the political context are in line with Fischer’s hypothesis that ministerial resignations do not follow the constitutional norm of ministerial responsibility, but are the result of a political cost-benefit analysis (Fischer, 2012; 614). Dewan and Dowding (2005) concluded ministerial resignation in the UK actually increases the popularity of the government, thereby underscoring the electoral

25

use of resignations (Woodhouse, 1994). Therefore, the connection between the constitutional rules of ministerial responsibility and actual resignations ‘is often not much more than a political rhetorical idea, which is established by the protagonists themselves in resignation issues’ (Fischer, 2012; 616).

WHERE YOU STAND: THE TEN RULES AND POLITICAL ELITE GROUPS

In their explanation of effective blame avoidance behaviour during incident-induced accountability processes – both as a strategy and as an ideal practice – key political actors discerned ten ‘rules of the game’. These ten rules of rules could be distinguished according to four different categories: (a) Institutional context, (b) the ministers’ blame avoidance behavior, (c) the ministers’ reputation, (d) political context.

Rule nr.

Rule characterizations

Explanation

Type

1

Ministerial responsibility works as a spotlight on the minister Don’t make ethical blunders

The convention of ministerial responsibility focuses the blame game on the minister Integrity incidents are much more norm-related than policy failures Blaming civil servants and not informing parliament are two strategies which could be lethal Launching and independent investigation is widely seen as a very effective strategy Besides the content of strategies, actors have expectations about the timing of the minister’s defence Besides the content of strategies, actors have expectations about the tone of the minister’s defence Reputation and (formal)

Institutional context

2

3

Refrain from ‘mortal sins’

4 5

Launch independent investigation Appear decisive

6

Show humility

7

The

strong

an

survive

Support for xliii ‘rule’ Strong

Institutional context

Strong

Blame avoidance behaviour

Weak

Blame avoidance behaviour Blame avoidance behaviour

Very strong

Blame avoidance behavior

Weak

(prior)

Strong

Weak

26

more easily

position play an important reputation role in actors perceptions of a ministers’ accountability 8 Avoid being seen as When a ministers’ Reputation Very strong hapless or leadership capital is incorrigible damaged and he gets a reputation of ‘repeat offender’ the minister is politically ‘dying’ 9 The political leader The party leader is the most Political Very strong will seal the important accountability context minister’s fate forum who can sanction a minister 10 A minister must not Resignations in the end are Political Strong become an electoral about political opportunity: context liability or damage is the minister a liability the coalition cohesion towards the electorate of the coalition Table 2: summary of the ten ‘rules’ of the blame game the minister has to adhere to in political accountability processes, according to key political actors

Some rules were much more prevalent among the interviewees, while other rules lived only in the perceptions of some groups. For example, while most civil servants, of course, considered blaming administrators a weak strategy, parliamentarians were prone to condemn a minister withholding information which was in their eyes vital. The strongest rules however, apply to the political and institutional context. Therefore, key political participants of the blame game seem to perceive two important contextual constraints in blame games in a coalition context: socially grown practices and coalition considerations, which will be discussed in the conclusion.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This paper provides the first empirical exploration of the perceptions of political elite in a coalition system regarding effective blame avoidance behavior of troubled ministers. This paper used qualitative vignettes to derive general blame game patterns regarding ministerial conduct from concrete situations. During the discussion of the qualitative vignettes and the open questions, interviewees referred to multiple intangible factors

27

that

influence

ministerial

responsibility

and

political

accountability

processes:

atonement, trust, confidence, atmosphere, image, and sentiment. Context matters and many rules indeed constrain the blame game after incidents and can influence a minister’s resignation (see figure 1).

Figure 1: 10 rules for ministers in coalition blame games, graphic representation

To some extent, the results may relate to specificities of some Dutch perceptions, but mirroring the results against existing literature suggest that the contextual rules for ministers in a Dutch coalition system transcend both the specific sample and the national context. One should be careful not to overstate the conclusions of this research. However, the conclusions clearly inform our research agenda. First, constitutional conventions such as ministerial responsibility and handbooks of ‘good ministerial behaviour’ affect the idea of what good ministerial behaviour is during political incidents, such as keeping confidence and avoiding integrity incidents. Besides, the perceptions of (not) effective blame avoidance strategies point towards historically grown practices which make certain strategies more accepted than others among political actors. Although the importance of appearing decisive and humble (rule

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5 and 6) was not widely reflected upon, impression management and dramaturgy (Hajer, 2005) could be related components of expected discursive strategies. Olsen recently pointed out, that in settled polities ‘repertoires of socially constructed and validated accounts and responses to accounts (exist), influenced by what is intelligible, expected and anticipated, appropriate and legitimate in specific political-cultural contexts’ (Olsen, 2013; 459; cf. March and Olsen, 1995; Thompson 1987). Such a direction in blame avoidance research would also mean a turn in the way blame avoidance research is conducted. Besides the parliamentary documents and newspaper reports current research is based upon, the inclusion of television and new, social media and interviews with key actors would be needed to capture these often implicit processes. This study gives a first direction towards the need to study the effect of the institutional context, the political acceptance of certain strategies among actors and dramaturgy in blame game patterns within and between political contexts. Second, it is clear that interviewees weighed their perceptions of the minister under attack as either strong or weak in their judgment. Literature on ministerial survival already includes a ministers’ formal position in the explanations of whether ministers will survive or resign (Bovens et al, 2014; Dewan & Dowding, 2005). However, two more intangible aspects of a minister’s position and reputation play a role in the perceptions of key actors: a ‘strong’ reputation and ‘having a clear sheet’. While the last aspect can only partly be measured by votes of no-confidence, future research on ministerial survival would benefit from a more nuanced assessment than often used in research on ministerial survival. Leadership capital could be a helpful conceptual tool to add to the study of ministerial survival. Finally, the literature on ministerial responsibility and ministerial survival is so far mostly focused on Westminster parliamentary systems. This research underscores that political accountability and ministerial resignations in coalition contexts could be controlled by different actors and different ideas of what is ‘politically opportune’ than the more straightforward Westminster context, which is controlled by the prime minister. In coalition governments, the minister has to appease multiple coalition

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parties, with often multiple interpretations of an incident and is essentially caught in the web of his political leader, with coalition considerations forming large parts of the web. At the same time, the minister can more easily survive, because a ministers’ resignation is often a large destabilizing factor in fragile coalition blocks. Besides, the ministers’ adversaries, especially moderate opposition parties, are constrained by future coalition considerations; the opponent of today can be the ally of tomorrow. Bovens and others (1999) already pointed towards the rather modest, ‘self-restraining’ character of the Dutch politics of blame avoidance. Therefore, it appears to be that the need to maintain coalitions does not only change who are the important actors in the blame game (political leader) and the contextual factors that influence the blame game (coalition considerations), but also the tone and offensiveness of the blame game patterns. Future research could flesh out this expectation by pursuing a comparative design of Westminster versus coalition parliamentary systems.

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Uhr, J. (2005) ‘Ministerial Responsibility in Australia: 2005.’ Paper presented at the Constitutional Law Conference, UNSW Sydney, 18 February 2005 Visser, R.K. (2008) In dienst van het algemeen belang: Ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid

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Woliver, L.R. (2002), ‘Ethical Dilemmas in Personal Interviewing’, PS: Political Science & Politics 35(4); 677–678. Woodhouse, D. (1993) ‘Ministerial Responsibility in the 1990s. When do Ministers Resign?’, Parliamentary Affairs, 46, 3, 277–92. Woodhouse, D. (1994) Ministers and Parliament. Accountability in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Appendix 1: list of respondents (obtainable from author upon request) Appendix 2: interviewprotocol (In Dutch) Vragen vóór vignetten: -

Achtergrond + hoe vaak te maken met onderwerp (dus incidenten en ministers onder druk)? In hoeverre identificeert u zich met één van de vier rollen? (voor mensen met gemixte achtergrond) Wat is voor het eerste waar u aan denkt als het gaat over verantwoord ministerieel handelen na incidenten? Beschrijving van manier van interviewen: scenario’s, etc. Het uitwisselen van verwachtingen over interview. o scenario a.d.h.v. 3 stappen: situatie, eerste reactie, uitkomst o manier om wat dieper in te gaan op verschillende normen rond ‘verantwoord ministerieel handelen’ o kan zijn dat het scenario dat ik schets in uw ogen niet plausibel is, dan kunt u dit aangeven en ook aangeven op welke manier deze wel plausibel zou zijn. o Daarnaast zijn het natuurlijk korte, vereenvoudigde scenario’s, u mag de situatie verder invullen indien u dit nodig vindt in uw antwoord: dus: dat ligt eraan, indien… (dus doorvragen: welke actoren betrokken, met welke actoren zal de minister rekening houden in dit incident?)

Vignet 1 De Telegraaf onthult dat verschillende ministers nogal innige banden hebben met het bedrijfsleven, vooral de ministers van Economische Zaken en Defensie worden bekritiseerd. De minister van EZ zou namelijk in het privévliegtuig van een energiebedrijf naar een Frans tennistoernooi zijn meegevlogen. Een ander bedrijf (dat nieuwe gevechtsvliegtuigen ontwikkelt) heeft de minister van Defensie een fles wijn gestuurd van enkele duizenden euro’s. De minister heeft deze fles wijn niet aangemeld bij bureau Protocol (AZ). Meerdere kranten, waaronder de Volkskrant en Financieel dagblad, nemen het nieuws over. Het CDA en de SP spreken schande van het gedrag van de ministers en eisen uitleg van beide ministers.

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1. Hoe zou u op dit incident waarderen vanuit uw rol als …? (voor journalisten): Hoe zou u dit incident beschrijven? 2. Wat vindt u dat de ministers (afzonderlijk) nu zouden moeten doen? (norm) 3. Wat denkt u dat de ministers zullen doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de minister? (strategisch) De minister van EZ geeft aan de ophef niet te begrijpen. Volgens haar woordvoerder: ‘is de minister gewoon ontzettend kosher, dus zo’n reis is geen probleem’. De minister van Defensie claimt zowel in Parlement als op tv dat hij zich niet herinnert ooit zo’n fles wijn te hebben ontvangen. 1. Wat vindt van de uitleg van de minister? (vanuit rol als..) 2. Wat vindt u dat de minister nu zou moeten doen? 3. Wat denkt u dat de ministers hierna zullen doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de minister? De minister van EZ blijft zitten, ondanks de verontwaardiging die wordt geuit door oppositiepartijen van beide kanten van het politieke spectrum. De minister van Defensie komt kort na zijn Kameroptreden terug op zijn uitspraken. Zijn staf heeft in zijn correspondentie-archief een kopie van een handgeschreven bedankkaartje gevonden. De minister zegt zich het voorval nog steeds niet herinneren, maar moet nu constateren dat hij de Kamer onjuist heeft geïnformeerd. Hij meldt dat hij - na overleg met zijn partijleider - voornemens is om af te treden. 1. Hoe waardeert u het aftreden van de Defensieminister en het aanblijven van de EZ-minister? 2. Wat hadden de ministers volgens u ook kunnen of moeten doen in reactie op de onthullingen? 3. In hoeverre had het voor u uitgemaakt als bekend werd dat één of beide twee bedrijven die in deze incidenten voorkomen recentelijk een contract hebben gekregen bij het desbetreffende ministerie, ook al is er (vooralsnog) geen bewijs dat de ministers zich persoonlijk met deze contracten hebben bemoeid? Vignet 2 De NOS doet verslag van de moord op een gedetineerde door een medegedetineerde in een penitentiaire inrichting. De straftijd van de vermoorde man, die een verstandelijke beperking had, was al verlopen, maar door een communicatiefout binnen de inrichting was hij nog niet vrijgelaten. Daarnaast waren de bewaarders, die ten tijde van de moord dienst hadden op de afdeling, niet op de hoogte gebracht van het feit dat de gedetineerden al meerdere keren een hoogoplopende ruzie hadden. Het blijkt dat deze communicatiefouten op de afdeling van de gevangenis vaker voorkomen. Mensenrechtenorganisaties bekritiseren de Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen in de media en GroenLinks eist een spoeddebat met de staatssecretaris van Justitie. 1. Hoe zou u op dit incident waarderen vanuit uw rol als …? (voor journalisten): Hoe zou u dit incident beschrijven? 2. Wat vindt u dat de staatssecretaris zou moeten doen? (norm) 3. Wat denkt u dat de staatssecretaris zal doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de staatssecretaris? (strategisch) Volgens penitentiair deskundigen laat dit voorval zien dat de bezuinigingen in het gevangeniswezen de veiligheid van gevangenen en de zorgvuldigheid van strafuitoefening op het spel zetten. DJI staat al langer onder druk en is al eerder gewaarschuwd dat de bewaking van gedetineerden met geestelijke problemen tekortschiet. De staatssecretaris geeft in het spoeddebat aan de moord te betreuren en belooft de Kamer dat de DJI onder verscherpt departementaal toezicht wordt geplaatst.

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Hij zegt: 'Dit had nooit mogen gebeuren. Ik grijp in om zulke fouten in de toekomst te voorkomen’. Hij ontraadt een door de oppositie ingediende motie voor een breed en onafhankelijk onderzoek naar de kwaliteits- en veiligheidszorg binnen detentiecentra. 1. Wat vindt van de uitleg van de staatssecretaris? (vanuit rol als..) 2. Wat vindt u dat de staatssecretaris nu zou moeten doen? 3. Wat denkt u dat de staatssecretaris hierna zal doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de staatssecretaris? Bij verschillende kranten en ook bij talkshows worden de ambtelijke blunders in dit incident nog wekenlang aangehaald als een voorbeeld van misstanden binnen de overheid. De blunders worden telkens gelinkt aan de naam van de staatssecretaris, die al eerder negatief in het nieuws was gekomen op dit gevoelige dossier. De laatste peilingen voor de komende Kamerverkiezingen (over ruim vier maanden) geven aan dat grote aantallen kiezers het vertrouwen in de partij van de staatssecretaris willen opzeggen. Het incident lijkt daarmee ook invloed te hebben op de verhoudingen binnen het kabinet. De staatssecretaris geeft aan, na overleg met de MP en de partijleider, zijn verantwoordelijkheid te nemen en te zullen aftreden. 1. Hoe waardeert u het aftreden van de staatssecretaris? 2. Waren er in deze situatie verdedigbare en politiek levensvatbare alternatieven voor aftreden geweest? 3. In hoeverre weegt de timing van het incident in relatie tot de electorale cyclus mee in uw oordeelsvorming? Vignet 3 Twee jaar geleden kondigden de ministers voor Wonen en Rijksdienst en voor I&M een nieuw initiatief aan onder de noemer ‘Isoleer uw huis, bestrijd klimaatsverandering’. Het plan stelde 3 miljard aan subsidies beschikbaar aan individuele huiseigenaren om de isolatie van hun huizen te verbeteren en zo hun energieverbruik te verminderen. Volgens de ministers had het plan twee grote voordelen: het zou geld in de noodlijdende bouwwereld pompen en bijdragen aan de verwezenlijking van de klimaatdoelstellingen van het kabinet. Er is massaal gebruik gemaakt van de subsidies. Nieuwe isolatiebedrijven springen als paddenstoelen uit de grond. In de loop van de twee jaar ontstaan er echter verschillende problemen: in vier afzonderlijke incidenten worden installateurs (drie ervan jongens in opleiding) geëlektrocuteerd bij het installeren van het materiaal; er is een toename van het aantal branden ten gevolge van kortsluiting; en verschillende media berichten dat er massaal wordt gefraudeerd door huiseigenaren. 1. Hoe zou u op dit incident waarderen vanuit uw rol als …? (voor journalisten): Hoe zou u dit incident beschrijven? 2. Wat vindt u dat de minister zou moeten doen? (norm) 3. Wat denkt u dat de minister zal doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de staatssecretaris? (strategisch) De ministers geven aan de doden te betreuren en de fraudeclaims te gaan onderzoeken. Zij leggen uit dat het plan wat betreft beoogde werkgelegenheid en energiedoelstellingen een succes lijkt te worden. Zij willen verder geen commentaar te geven, omdat zij wachten op het onderzoek van de Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport. De Tweede Kamer besluit echter dat een Inspectierapport niet genoeg is en stelt een Parlementaire Enquête in. De ministers getuigen tijdens de Enquête-verhoren. De Minister van Wonen en Rijksdienst geeft aan dat het probleem ligt bij een netwerk van verschillende partijen. Het zijn immers de malafide isolatiebedrijven die schuldig zijn aan de doden, opportunistische burgers die schuldig zijn aan het misbruiken van subsidies en de

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inspectie die hier niet goed op heeft gecontroleerd. De minister van I&M geeft toe dat het plan sneller werd uitgerold dan ambtelijk was voorzien, omdat de Minister-President de bouwwereld wilde helpen. Op de stelling van een van de commissieleden dat het plan om politieke redenen per se vóór de Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen moest worden gepresenteerd, wilde geen van beide ministers ingaan. Wat vindt van de uitleg van de ministers? (vanuit rol als..) Wat vindt u dat de ministers nu zouden moeten doen? Wat denkt u dat de ministers hierna zullenl doen? Of: Wat zou u aanraden als adviseur van de ministers? De Enquêtecommissie concludeert dat met name de minister van Wonen en Rijksdienst en zijn ambtenaren zijn tekortgeschoten in de controle op uitvoering van de subsidieregelingen. Er was onvoldoende oog voor de kwaliteit van de isolatiebedrijven die van de subsidies profiteerden. De minister heeft volgens de commissie de Kamer niet goed geïnformeerd over de problemen met het nieuwe isolatieplan. De minister geeft in het verantwoordingsdebat aan dat hij het Enquêterapport deels onderschrijft, maar vindt dat de conclusie over causaliteit en het verkeerd informeren van de Kamer te sterk zijn. De minister geeft aan te willen ‘optreden in plaats van aftreden’ en lanceert een cultuuromslag bij de inspectie. Drie grote oppositiepartijen dienen motie van wantrouwen in tegen de minister van Wonen en Rijksdienst. De minister draagt het onderdeel van zijn portefeuille dat met dit plan te maken heeft over aan de minister van I&M, maar treedt niet af. 1. Hoe waardeert u het aanblijven van de minister van Wonen en Rijksdienst? 2. In hoeverre had het voor u uitgemaakt als de besluiten m.b.t de isolatiesubsidie zijn genomen door een voorgaande minister van dezelfde politieke kleur? En er dus een kabinetswissel tussen het plan en de aan het licht komen van de problemen is geweest? 3. Wat had de minister moeten doen volgens u? Na 2 vignettes: -

Hebben we met deze scenario’s de kern van het vraagstuk bereikt? In hoeverre hebben we het gehad over ministeriele verantwoordelijkheid en incidenten?

-

In hoeverre ziet u scenario’s als deze terug in huidige NL politiek?

-

In welk krachtenveld zit de minister bij negatieve publiciteit en publieke verantwoordingsdruk naar aanleiding van dergelijke beleids- of persoonlijke incidenten? Welke actoren zitten er in het krachtenveld rondom deze incidenten?

-

Waar hangt het volgens u vanaf of ministers voor dit incidenten moeten aftreden of niet? (schaal 1 = weinig effect op aftreden/5 = groot effect op aftreden)  zelf nummeren.       

Persoonlijke achtergrond minister: man/vrouw, opleiding, karakter Verleden: eerder onder vuur Samenstelling coalitie Nabijheid verkiezingen De verantwoordelijkheid leggen bij ambtenaren Populariteit binnen de partij Reputatie naar burgers/media

Indien mogelijk in gesprek (meer of minder specifiek met voorbeelden verleden): -

Eigen betrokkenheid (+ ervaring) in rol als…… ministeriele betrokkenheid is opgekomen?

bij incidenten waarin vraag

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o

o

o o

Journalisten: Hoe ziet u rol van de media bij de publieke discussie over dergelijke incidenten? Hoe komt verslaggeving en standpunt krant tot stand? (oud)bewindslieden: wat gebeurde er als zo’n incident zich voordeed op uw terrein? Wat doet u/met wie contact (voorbereiding/strategiebepaling)? Parlementariërs: binnen beleidsterrein/binnen fractie, met wie overleg etc indien zo’n incident zich voordeed binnen uw portfolio? (top)ambtenaren: gebeurt er binnen departement (voorbereiding/strategiebepaling) als zich een beleids- respectievelijk een persoonlijk incident rond de bewindspersoon voordoet? Wanneer, waartoe hoe contact met minister? Wat is je ambtelijke rol/verantwoordelijkheid in dezen?

i

Research on blame avoidance so far only used quantitative vignettes (McGraw,1990; 1991; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006)i. Quantitative vignettes are an ideal method to gather extensive causal evidence and make systematic comparisons between groups. They do not fit the purpose of this research however, as they do not provide the interviewees with an opportunity to elicit perceptions of why they appreciated the one justification of a minister over the other and do not reveal prioritization processes actors use to appraise a minister’s conduct (Wilks, 2004; 81-82). For this reason we use qualitative vignette methodology. ii

The interview protocol can be found in the appendix (in Dutch) Especially with regard to top civil servants this had a positive influence, as these vignettes helped them to reflect on the issue of ministers under pressure while at the same time they helped them to avoid directly reflecting on their current political principals. iv Depended on the time I had for the interview. v The vignettes were pre-tested on comprehensibility, ambiguity and plausibility by two public administration scholars, three PhD’s and three outside persons. After every interview, the interviewees were asked whether the vignettes dealt with the core of the ideas about incidents and ministerial conduct and whether the vignettes were plausible. vi This means that interviewees either experienced a resignation (personal, or close by), or that they had enough years of experience to observe multiple political incidents, thereby making sure that the selection of interviewees was meaningful. vii The important difference for parliamentarians and ex-office holders was party affiliation (and for officeholders: department). For journalists this was the type of media (newspaper and television) and difference between more ‘populist’ and more ‘elitist’ source. For top civil servants, the main divide was a spread over different departments. Although it does to completely guard the interviewer against self-serving or "partyline" accounts, it helps at least to diminish the bias to some extent (Berry, 2002; 680). With regard to the departmental background of top civil servants, the group of civil servants from the Justice Department is largest. This is not surprising as it is one of the most policy incident-prone ministries in the Netherlands and as Justice-ministers are overrepresented in Dutch ministerial resignations (Bovens et al, 2014). iii

viii

This is opposed to some other parliamentary democracies such as Germany, where parliament does not have the possibility of passing a vote of no-confidence against a minister, but where the decision to dismiss a minister is solely in the hands of the federal chancellor (Fischer, 2012; 604). ix Het gaat om de symbolische werking, om het publieke toneel van de politiek. Daar moeten de kiezers zien, er is een politicus die de guts heeft om de verantwoordelijkheid voor zijn fouten te nemen. (Journalist 2) x Nou in principe is dat van alles, wat onder jou en je voorgangers heeft plaatsgevonden. Maar dat is nog iets anders welke gevolgtrekkingen je daaraan verbindt, dat wordt vaak slecht onderscheiden vind ik. Dus ze zeggen: u bent verantwoordelijk. Dan zeg ik: ja ik ben wel verantwoordelijk, maar waar ik verantwoordelijk voor ben hoef je niet meteen de doodstraf voor te vragen he. dus daar mag wel enige.. (ex-minister 1) xi often interviewees said: yes, only if the facts are just too serious. However, only few could give examples of an incident which was serious enough in itself. xii P: Die.. kijk, want dat wilde ik nog even zeggen: essentieel is gewoon wat voor stouts er allemaal gebeurd is onder jouw verantwoordelijkheid, het gaat allemaal om vertrouwen. Het gaat om vertrouwen, heb je vertrouwen dat die man of vrouw het verder gaat doen en.. of een grote misser in het systeem gaat corrigeren en ja dat.. (ex minister 4) xiii Want je ziet er doorheen sijpelen, we hebben het nu ook vaak gehad over vertrouwen van de Kamer, en eh.. maar strict genomen gaat het natuurlijk niet om dat iemand moet aftreden als die het vertrouwen van de pers, of van de gemiddelde burger op straat niet meer heeft, maar het is natuurlijk toch wel een factor die altijd wel meeweegt in het ja, als we ook nog te maken hebben met een vertrouwenskloof tussen eh, burger

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en overheid. Dan helpt het ook niet als er een sfeer ontstaat van koste wat het kost op het pluche houden van een bewindspersoon. (parliamentarian 4) xiv (top civil servant 1, 2, 3, 5, 6) xv Het duurt een tijd, dat je begrijpt dat staatsrecht een aantal fundamenten heeft, en over die fundamenten elke keer onderdeel zijn van het maatschappelijk debat. Overigens veranderen van karakter. Hier hebben we zo ongeveer het meest interessante voorbeeld te pakken daarvan, normen die op dat punt enorm zijn veranderd. Zie bijvoorbeeld het aftreden van Theo Langejan he, mijn opvolger bij de NZA, om aan te geven hoe subtiel dat allemaal is. In mijn tijd zag je dat die normen aan het veranderen waren. Nu is het inmiddels zo dat in de zorg ongeveer alles naar het buitenland is geschrapt. Omdat he, omdat men dat dus niet meer wil. Dus ik moet dit beantwoorden met de kennis van nu, met de situatie van nu…. daar is inmiddels heel duidelijk geworden dat het maatschappelijke en politieke acceptatie van dit soort schijn van belangenverstrengeling buitengewoon minder is geworden en ik denk dat het meevliegen van een minister van EZ in een privevliegtuig van een energiebedrijf naar een Frans tennistoernooi, al is er geen sprake van dat de minister iets heeft gedaan ten gunste van het energiebedrijf, de schijn van belangenverstrengeling is daarmee gewekt. Dit is vrees ik het einde van de politieke carriere van de minister. xvi S: Ja, dat geloof ik wel. Daarom bedoelde ik in die top ook echt fout, en daar vallen ook zeg maar integriteitskwesties onder, je wilt als politiek ook echt wel een norm hooghouden dat je niet een beetje gesjoemel gaat accepteren. Dus dat je daar misschien wel heel strikt in bent, ook vanuit normhandhaving. Vanuit handhaving, dat je denkt ja jongens, qua beleidsfouten, of er is echt een incident, dat je ook wel een zeker marge proeft dat je denkt: daar moet je mee oppassen, want anders dan.. eh, als je consequent doorredeneert en er wordt in zo'n enorm apparaat als Justitie is of de IRT, er kan allicht wel een keer iets misgaan. En als dat gelijk het aftreden moet zijn, waar zijn we dan mee bezig, is dat het wel goed voor het bestuur. Aan de andere kant als het om integriteitskwesties gaat, daar willen we gewoon geen gedoe in. We willen daar gewoon een norm hooghouden, en eh. maar weinig ruimte laten, daar zit je veel dichter. Daar heb je ook niet een soort, motief van: waarom zou je daar veel ruimte laten? xvii Ja, dat kan absoluut niet, dat is denk ik einde oefening. tenzij de minister een heel groot parlementair vertrouwen heeft en iedereen zegt: Ja jezus, ja, we willen hem niet kwijt, want dit is een hele goede minister en die is bijvoorbeeld heel populair bij de bevolking of de achterban, of hartstikke goed in het aansturen van, heel goed in haar werk, groot internationaal netwerk. Dan zijn er contra-indicaties waardoor het toch niet doorgaat, maar dan krijg je waarschuwingen als: de Kamer gaat dit wel betreuren en dan hoef je niet weg. De eens maar nooit weer situaties xviii journalist 5, journalist 6 (lying), journalist 7, parliamentarian 4, and 8, parliamentarian 1, 2, 3, top civil servant 4, xix Als hij de Kamer onjuist heeft geinformeerd, dan gaat hij altijd weg. Dan gaat het over iets anders... Het is een soort wet dat je, de grootste zonde die je kunt bedrijven in de politiek, dat je de Kamer onjuist geinformeerd hebt, opzettelijk. Dus je krijgt natuurlijk wel weer een discussiepunt als het nu per ongeluk is. (parliamentarian 8) xx Kijk mevrouw …, die is nu ineens weer betrokken, die gaat nu ineens schutteren in de Kamer, komt daar niet uit, heeft geen gezag daar, gaat in die kamer de onbeschrijfelijke fout maken door daar het ambtelijke apparaat te beschuldigen. Dan gaat iedereen zich ermee bemoeien en dan is het ineens een crisis. xxi op gedeelde verantwoordelijkheid en burgers niet zo gezegd door slimme minister: immers onvoldoende uitleg, politiek niet slim want lijkt op afschuiven (parliamentarian 4) xxii Ja, je ziet zeker bij de zwakkere bewindslieden dat ze nogal eens de neiging hebben om de ambtelijke dienst in het openbaar de schuld te geven als een soort excuus, in de hoop daarmee weg te komen. (top civil servant 3). xxiii R: Die zegt wat. En een spoeddebat met de staatssecretaris. Dat betekent dat je niet veel tijd hebt. Daar tussendoor. Je hebt tijd nodig om te feiten op een rij te zetten, dus het eerste wat ik dan zou zeggen tegen de kamer van, hoor eens, het ziet er niet fraai uit. Maar gun me de tijd om een onderzoek te doen en dan zal ik u laten weten wat mijn bevindingen zijn, wat ik gedaan heb en wat ik eventueel niet gedaan heb of wat ik nog zal doen. (ex-minister 7) xxiv R: Ja, te defensief reageren. Dus bij een incident met een hoge gevoeligheid is het gewoon volgens mij altijd goed om stevig onderzoek te doen en onafhankelijk onderzoek want als je dat niet doet dan blijft er altijd een zweem hangen van oh, er kan nog wel meer boven tafel komen en dat wil je waarschijnlijk niet dus, terwijl als je stevig onderzoek aankondigt en er komt nog meer boven tafel dan kan je dat ook gewoon aanpakken want dan heb je dat zelf naar boven gebracht. (top civil servant 2) xxv Want je zal het incident eerst moeten onderzoeken. Het is vaak een reflex he? En het publiek wil dat ook graag. Ik heb ook het onderzoek geleid naar Koninginnedag, he, Apeldoorn. M; Ik zag het ja. R: En al die onderzoeken zijn gedaan door die ene inspectie, dat is alleen niet heel erg bekend. Maar daar zag je ook he, zo’n onderzoek trechtert de emotie. He, Nederland he, van hoe kan dat nou? Overigens vinden heel veel mensen, veel media vond het niet zo’n goed onderzoek want alles was goed. (top civil servant 6) xxvi (journalist 2 and 5, minister 1 and 2, parliamentarian 4). xxvii Mth: een bewindsman kan zijn falen goedmaken door krachtig op te treden, zijn fouten goed te maken. Als je wilt weten wat ik daar van vind, dan zou ik zeggen: dan zou ik zeggen, klinkt lekker, klinkt goed. Het sluit ook goed aan bij de grote waardering die in de publieke opinie voor krachtdadigheid kan worden opgebracht, dat vind ik wel een tendens in de politiek, die behoefte aan daadkracht en kortdaadheid en niet te lang twijfelen, maar besluiten nemen. Dat kan ik niet objectiveren, maar mijn indruk is wel dat het sterker is dan vroeger. xxviii Wat een andere tactiek is: en dat zie je vaak, moet je het mondelinge vragenuurtje, als je dat volgt, het geldt eigenlijk ook voor schriftelijke antwoorden op schiftelijke kamervragen, dus er komt iets vreselijks naar

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boven en dinsdagmiddag zegt de minister: nou wij hebben gister net besloten om, inmiddels hebben we overlegd en bla bla bla... Klaar. De wind uit de zeilen. (parliamentarian 1) xxix Ja dat kan zich toespitsen en op enig moment, dat zie je dus ook wel, op enig moment als de minister de kamer niet serieus neemt dan kan dat zomaar omslaan. Dat zie je, bijvoorbeeld toen ik Balkenende in de kamer zat, ik weet niet welke zaak dat toen geweest is. Maar als je dan voelt: je wordt geschoffeerd als het ware, dan is het zelfs voor een aantal traditionele partijen, toch een reden om te zeggen; en nou is het genoeg geweest. Dit klopt niet. En er wordt dan ook vaak gezegd van tevoren: Teeven, boetekleed, boetekleed, sorry zeggen, door het stof, door het stof. En ja, dat is dan de draai waar de coalitiepartijen mee zwaaien: de minister heeft inzicht getoond, berouw getoond, maar op het moment dat je hier zo doet, dan kan dat net wel de reden zijn dat je zegt: de minister heeft schijt aan de kamer, ik noem maar wat. Dan kan zich dat wel toespitsen. Toch op een motie van wantrouwen. (parliamentarian 1) xxx Dus misschien is dat wel het topje van de ijsberg, weetje, als het zo gaat. Dus het geeft het geeft je het idee van een soort lichtzinnigheid die je niet zou mogen verwachten bij die mensen in zo’n positie, ik denk dat het parlement hier bovenop duikt en wij des te meer natuurlijk. Dan ga je echt zoeken. (journalist 9) xxxi Ja, de positie van de betrokkene in de partij. Als je het hebt over een belangrijke meneer of mevrouw, die staat wat steviger, want ja dan zijn de risico's groot. Dan kan de coalitie onder spanning komen te staan. Wat is het imago van betrokkenen? Heeft ie het imago van een brekebeen, of is het iemand die heel stevig staat? Bijvoorbeeld, er is nu net een incidentje rond (minister Financien) gebeurd, dan praat je het toch over een populaire minister van Financien, dan praat je toch over wat anders dan een staatssecretaris weekers betrof. Dus het zijn dit soort situationele dingen: de positie van betrokkenen, het verleden van betrokkenen, de positie in zijn eigen partij. zijn imago, als je een dijk van een imago hebt, dan is zo'n incidentje, dan zegt de media vaak: He joh, dat is vervelend, maar het kan gebeuren. overal gaat een keer wat mis, maar ja als het al een beetje een brekebeen is, een hakkelaar is, dan ruikt men bloed. Ja, dat is een zwak figuur, dat zou wel eens een duwtje kunnen zijn. Eens kijken of we daar een beetje leuk nieuws kunnen maken, zo gaat dat. xxxii Als hij verder een krachtige bestuurder is, integer, gezagvol binnen de partij, gezagvol in het parlement, gezagvol binnen de oppositie. xxxiii (quote) xxxiv S: Maar nu blijft zij zitten, dat moet nu maar, maar stel: je blijft zitten, maar dat.. maar eigenlijk moet je dat zien als: dat telt toch wel. Mensen, kijk dat merk je ook vaak bij de Tweede Kamer als er weer een incident is. En dat hoeft niet hetzelfde te zijn he, daar ga jij vanuit. Maar er is weer een ander incident, dat stapelt op. Dat is, ik zal het maar even zeggen: je bonuslijstje. Als dat alsmaar negatief is, dan neemt dat vertrouwen bij de Tweede Kamer ook maar af. Dat zeggen tweede Kamerleden ook altijd in debatten: Ja, maar u heeft toen ook al dat en dat. Het geheugen voor negatieve dingen is natuurlijk heel groot, xxxv (zucht): Nee, eigenlijk niet, kijk een minister die een sterke positie heeft, kijk de Kamer is een stel wolven. Begrijp je? Als ze ruiken dat jij zwak bent, of je nu een meisje bent of een jongen, het is een pikorde. Dan blijven ze, dan vliegen ze je aan. Dan sla je ze weer een beetje van je af, eh, maar ze hebben je al een beetje verwond zal ik maar zeggen. En de volgende keer heeft ie de wond net dicht en dan slaan ze er een ander in. xxxvi H: Ja ja ja. Dus hoe dat werkt is wel fascinerend om te zien hoor, waar publiciteit en politiek elkaar op de een of andere manier vinden. Waarbij nou ja, zeg maar de chocoladeletters van de Telegraaf natuurlijk toch ook wel spelen in de politiek. Als je geframed wordt als brekebeen, of als klungel, of als... Dat kan je behoorlijk uitvergroten. (top civil servant 5) xxxvii ik heb regelmatig bewindslieden meegemaakt die wat moeite hadden met het zien van de realiteit en die probeer je dan toch een beetje laten we zeggen te helpen. Het is een vorm van stervensbegeleiding, met een patient die dat nog niet helemaal doorheeft. xxxviii

(quote) En wat het meest voorkomend is, is de politieke leider van de betreffende regering. Dat is meestal de fractieleider van de tweede Kamer. Dat gaat echt dan langs die lijn. Die dan op een gegeven moment zegt: beste collega, het is nu echt onhoudbaar. Ja, wij vinden het heel vervelend, maar het zou beter zijn als je nu echt weggaat, wij kunnen dat niet goed.. en dan een stille hint dat het ook beter is voor de betrokkene zelf. (ex-minister 1) xl Dat gelazer moet nou eens afgelopen zijn, dan kan het zijn dat er wordt gezegd: je moet maar eens weggaan . en dat hoeft ie niet te doen hoor! Alhoewel..als de fractieleider zegt: nou, het is mooi geweest. Maar het zou niet gauw gebeuren. Nou, ja, tenzij er evident iets fout is. Het kan zijn dat deze man of een vrouw een uitermate zwak bewindspersoon bekend staat en misschien heeft ie hier geen ongelijk en kan hij hier niets aan doen, maar het beeld rond zo'n persoon kan zo fragiel worden, dat men zegt; joh mevrouw, zou u er niet beter aan doen om terug te treden. xli dat is de politieke realiteit. De zenuwen zijn altijd wat ruiger, op dat moment, dus dan wordt de tolerantiegraad wat kleiner. Dat zijn situationele omstandigheden, waarin theorieen in afweging een plek krijgen. Niets is een wiskundesom, het zijn elementen die je moet zien, en vervolgens komen daar situationele elementen bij en dit is er één van. En je hebt gewoon geen zin, om terwijl je je voorbereid op een verkiezingstrijd waarbij het gaat om de vraag wie er zometeen de regeringsmacht heeft, een dossier mee te slepen wat afleidt van het onderwerp waar je het over wilt hebben. En daarmee wordt zo'n bewindspersoon een liability. xxxix

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xlii

Het is ook vaak een overweging bij partijen.. Kijk als je als PvdA eist dat Fred Teeven moet aftreden, dan weet je dat a. de volgende voor wie ze komen is er één van jou. Dat is één. maar het levert ook problemen, er is heibel in de coalitie, je krijgt minder gedaan, je moet er misschien wel voor betalen in geld, op de begroting of wat ook, of verliezen aan vertrouwen of samenwerkingsbereidheid, enzovoorts, ehm xliii In the results one can see that some normative expectations are shared by more interviewees, and by more types of interviewees, than other normative expectations. For example less interviewees talked about mortal sins, while the appropriateness of launching an independent investigation was shared by almost all interviewees (except some top civil servants). The labels: weak, strong and very strong are a first attempt to distinguish between less widely shared rules and more widely shared rules of the game.

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